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Abstract 
 
This paper asks whether population growth is conducive to the sustainability of cooperation. 
A simple model is developed in which farmers who live around a circular lake engage in trade 
with their adjacent neighbors. The payoffs from this activity are governed by a prisoner’s 
dilemma “rule of engagement.” Every farmer has one son when the population is not growing, 
or two sons when it is growing. In the former case, the son takes over the farm when his 
father dies. In the latter case, one son stays on his father’s farm, whereas the other son settles 
around another lake, along with the “other” sons of the other farmers. During his childhood, 
each son observes the strategies and the payoffs of his father and of the trading partners of his 
father, and imitates the most successful strategy when starting farming on his own. Then 
mutant defectors are introduced into an all-cooperator community. The defector strategy may 
spread.  A  comparison  is  drawn  between  the  impact  in  terms  of  the  sustainability  of 
cooperation of the appearance of the mutants in a population that is not growing, and in one 
that is growing. It is shown that the ex-ante probability of sustaining the cooperation strategy 
is higher for a community that is growing than for a stagnant community. 
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1 Introduction 
In  this  paper  we  link  together  two  strands  of  the  literature:  that  on  the  evolution  and 
sustainability of cooperative behavior, and that which has long sought to demonstrate that 
population growth is conducive to the wellbeing of societies and nations (Simon, 1977, 1996). 
The purpose of this paper is to inquire whether and under what circumstances population 
growth  is  conducive,  or  detrimental,  to  the  sustainability  of  cooperative  behavior  in  a 
population. Obviously, these questions are so broad that it is virtually impossible to address 
them in general terms. We therefore resort to an example. We delineate a specific setting in 
which two cases - one without population growth, the other with - can be compared in a well 
defined manner. In the setting developed and presented in this paper, we find that it is more 
likely that cooperation will be sustained when a population is growing than when it is not. 
Under a standard one-shot prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure, cooperation is, on average, 
more conducive to survival than defection, as it confers a higher per capita payoff. Therefore, 
we are led to infer that in the specific setting studied by us, a growing population has some 
feature that better supports future population growth that a stagnant population does not have. 
In section 2 we delineate our basic model: farmers who are located around a lake trade 
with their neighbors in a setting in which the returns to trade are governed by a prisoner’s 
dilemma payoff structure, and where, to begin with, all the farmers are cooperators. In section 
3  we  tinker  with  the  model  by  assuming  that  one  or  two  defectors  appear  in  a  constant 
population of nine cooperators. We use nine farmers as our “canonical” example because nine 
is  the  smallest  settlement  size  for  which,  in  terms  of  the  sustainability  of  cooperation, 
qualitative differences appear between the no population growth and the population growth 
case.  We  calculate  the  probability  of  the  spread  of  the  defector  strategy  in  the  farmers’ 
community, and we show that the community has a significant chance of ending up as a pure 
defector community, which in turn has the lowest per capita payoff of all possible farmer-by-
type configurations. In section 4 we replicate the analysis of section 3 for a situation in which 
the population is growing. Once again, we allow for the appearance of one or two defectors in 
the  initial,  all-cooperator  population.  For  a  settlement  of  nine  farmers  we  calculate  the 
probability that the population will end up consisting entirely of defectors. We find that with 
two initial defectors, the probability is lower than it would be with a constant population. This 
leads us to conjecture that in our model, population growth is conducive to the sustainability 
of  cooperation.  In  section  5  we  provide  a  generalization:  stepping  beyond  the  case  of  a 
settlement  of  nine  farmers,  we  study  a  settlement  of  cooperators  of  any  size  in  which  a   2 
random  number  of  mutant  defectors  appear.  We  find  that  qualitatively  our  findings  carry 
through also to this general case: the ex-ante probability of the survival of cooperation is 
higher for a growing population than for a stagnant population. Section 6 explains how our 
approach relates to and differs from writings in evolutionary biology that study the impact of 
demographic processes on the prevalence of altruism. Section 7 concludes. In the appendix 
we present an extension of our model, postulating that progeny depends positively on payoffs. 
We show that such a constellation too can give rise to the main result reported in the body of 
the paper. 
 
2 The model 
We base our model on the perception that, typically, the success or failure of an individual 
who makes an economic decision is influenced by the choices made by others in his economic 
sphere. Following Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and more recently Stark and Behrens (2010, 
2011), we consider a population of n  farmers, where  3 n ≥  and is a natural number, who 
cultivate their plots which are arranged around a lake. Thus, every farmer has exactly two 
neighbors. Each of the n farmers trades with his immediate neighbors, one to his right, and 
one to his left.
1 We assume that trading is necessary for the proper functioning of a farm; 
every farmer thus has to engage in trade with his neighbors. 
The payoffs to a farmer from a trade are governed by a prisoner’s dilemma game in 
which he is either a cooperator, who plays C, or a defector, who plays D, with his two trading 
partners. The farmer’s overall payoff is the sum of the payoffs from playing with his two 
trading partners, where the payoff from the play with each partner is given by the following 
matrix: 
 
    Column player 
     C  D 
Row 
player 
C  R,R   S,T  
D  T,S   P,P  
where 
  T R P S > > > .  (1)   
                                                 
1 Obviously, three is the minimal number of farmers that allows an individual to have two neighbors to trade 
with.   3 
Additionally, we assume that 
  2R T P > + ,  (2) 
namely that a cooperator surrounded by cooperators (thereby receiving a payoff of 2R) is 
more successful (enjoys a higher total payoff) than a defector trading with a cooperator and a 
defector (thereby receiving a payoff of T P + ).   
Dynamics  is  introduced  into  the  model  in  the  form  of  learning  and  generational 
replacement.  A  farmer  belongs  to  one  generation t ,  0,1,2,... t = .  Life  is  divided  into  two 
periods  or  phases:  childhood,  and  farming-cum-trading.  At  the  beginning  of  the  second 
period, each farmer has one or two sons, depending on the population growth setting. 
During childhood, a son learns from observing the effects of the practices pursued by 
his father and his father’s trading partners. He finds out which practice (strategy) is the most 
successful (in terms of the sum of the payoffs) in the parental generation. When a son takes 
over the farming operations, he adopts the strategy that has yielded the highest payoff.  
This highly stylized structure accords with evidence that farmers’ decisions respond to 
the actions and outcomes of other farmers in their “geographic proximity.” Conley and Udry 
(2010) present evidence that the intensity of fertilizer use by farmers in southern Ghana is 
strongly  attributable  to  learning  from  their  “information  neighbors”  and  from  their  own 
experience.  
We start with a population of farmers who are all cooperators. This implies that each 
farmer receives from each trading relationship a payoff of R. 
To investigate the robustness or the sustainability of cooperation in the “ancestral” 
village community, we assume that in generation  0 t = , there is a mutation of cooperators into 
defectors  whose  strategy  could  well  spread  into  future  generations.  We  track  the 
consequences of the appearance of defector mutants in what otherwise is a pure cooperator 
population in two settings: one without population growth, the other with. We characterize 
population growth as a multiplication of farming settlements (ours is “a lake district”): when 
each farmer has two sons, one son takes over his father’s farm whereas the other son, along 
with the second sons of all the other farmers, settles around another lake, choosing his farm 
placement randomly. 
   4 
3 The sustainability of cooperation without population growth 
In this section, we study the case in which there is no population growth: each farmer has only 
one son, who takes over his father’s farm when the father passes away. We track the “history” 
of  the  farming  community  as  of  time  0 t =  when  one  or  two  cooperators  mutate  into 
defectors. 
One mutant defector 
In the ancestral village, let there be one random mutation into defection. In all the 
graphs that follow, farmers are represented by circles placed around the lake: a white circle 
stands for a cooperating farmer, a black circle - for a defector farmer. The letters P, R, S, T 
near the circles are the payoffs that a farmer gets from a trade with a neighbor. 
The generation  0 t =  population is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The strategies and the payoffs in a settlement of  9 n =  farmers, in generation  0 t = , 
and in the wake of one mutation. 
From condition (1) it follows that the mutant’s trait, which results in a total payoff of 
2T , will spread among the sons of the mutant’s two immediate neighbors, as his trait will be 
the most successful example in their neighborhood. Thus, at time  1 t = , the configuration will 
be as in Figure 2.   5 
 
Figure 2. Strategies and payoffs in a settlement of  9 n =  farmers, in generation  1 t = , and in 
the wake of one mutation. 
What  happens  in  the  next  generation  ( 2 t = )  depends  on  the  prevalence  of  a 
“cooperator island” of sufficient size (cf. Stark and Behrens, 2011), namely on whether the 
population size is large enough ( 6 n ≥ ) to allow for at least one cooperator to be surrounded 
only by cooperators, resulting in him receiving a total payoff of 2R. According to (2), the 
cooperator in the middle of a batch of cooperators will be more successful than a defector on 
the border of a cluster of two or more defectors who receives ( ) T P + , and therefore, the D 
trait will spread no more. Clearly, had the population size been less than 6, no successful 
“example” of playing C strategy would have been left, and the entire community would have 
ended up as a community of defectors.  
It is worth noting that in the case of a single mutant defector, the community outcome 
does not depend on the defector’s random placement; the spatial configuration is the same no 
matter in which farm the mutant happens to appear. 
Two mutant defectors 
The situation is more intricate when at  0 t =  there are two mutant defectors. To help 
us map the whereabouts of the defectors, we define a vector  ( ) ( ) 1 , ,..., k t D n k d d =  that traces 
the number of cooperators among the k  defectors in generation t.
2 
                                                 
2 For illustrative purposes, when presenting the configurations  ( ) ( ) 1 , ,...,
k t D n k d d =  we start enumerating the 
separating cooperators from the defector who is the first after “the 12 o’clock position” and proceed clockwise. 
Since the spread of the defection strategy depends only on the numbers of cooperators separating the k defectors, 
the configurations  ( ) ( ) 1 , ,...,
k t D n k d d =  are equivalent with respect to rotations and symmetric transformations. 
For example, the configuration  (9,4) (2,3,0,0)
t D =  is qualitatively equivalent to the configuration (0,2,3,0) 
or to the configuration (0,0,3,2). We will use the term “probability of a configuration” synonymously with “the   6 
There are 9 8 72 × =  possible initial placements of the two mutant defectors among the 
nine farmers. These placements can be pooled into four representative configurations that 
differ in substance one from the other, and occur each with probability 1/ 4: 
I
0(9,2) (7,0) D = , 
II
0 (9,2) (6,1) D = , 
III
0 (9,2) (5,2) D =  and 
IV
0 (9,2) (4,3) D = .  
The four parts of Figure 3 depict the evolution of the community structure in these 
four configurations. 
 
Figure 3. The evolution of strategies in a settlement of  9 n =  farmers in the wake of two 
random mutations. 
The repercussions of the spread of the defector strategy differ across the four cases, 
but they follow a simple general rule: when a defector is introduced into the population, his 
“momentary” success among neighboring cooperators is mimicked in the next generation by 
the sons of his immediate neighbors who learn from his example during their childhood. The 
repercussions depend on the relative placement of the two defectors in the community. We 
                                                                                                                                                         
probability  of  all  of  a  configuration’s  qualitative/structural  equivalents  (with  respect  to  rotations  and 
symmetry).”   7 
have two types of outcomes: 
(i)  when  the  mutant  defectors  are  separated  by  at  least  one  cooperator,  the  defector 
strategy  spreads  among  all  the  trading  partners  of  the  defectors  (configurations  II 
through IV in Figure 3); 
(ii) when the mutant defectors are placed one next to the other, condition (2) implies that 
their strategy will not be considered as successful by their neighbors if the size of the 
community is large enough for a successful cooperator to be left so as to serve as a 
good example (configuration I in Figure 3), and hence, the defector strategy does not 
spread among the defectors’ neighboring cooperators. 
In subsequent generations, the spread of the defector strategy stops in a manner akin to 
that of one mutant defector: when an “island of cooperation” of at least three cooperators is 
left, that is, when the  configuration allows for  at least one cooperator  to trade with only 
cooperators,  then  the  defector  strategy  does  not  appear  as  tempting  to  the  sons  of  the 
cooperating  farmers  in  the  neighborhood  of  this  successful  cooperator.  The  spread  of 
defection is halted. 
In sum: considering the question of the survival of cooperation in a population of nine 
farmers and two mutant defectors, only in one initial case - configuration 
IV
0 D  - is the result 
starkly  “negative;”  after  two  generations,  the  community  becomes  a  pure  defector 
community; the two clusters of cooperators in generation  1 t =  are too small for the C strategy 
to be successful in comparison with the D strategy in such a mixed population. Given this, we 
can state that in the current setup, the probability of sustaining cooperation in the wake of the 
mutation of two cooperators into defectors is 3/ 4, since the probability of each of the three 
“positive” configurations that does not allow elimination of cooperators (configurations 
I
0 D , 
II
0 D , and 
III
0 D ) is 1/ 4. 
In the next section we study the same setup but with population growth. We show that 
as  long  as  only  one  mutant  defector  appears  in  the  population,  there  are  no  distinct 
repercussions of population growth - compared to the case of no population growth - for the 
sustainability of cooperation in the farming population. However, when there are two mutant 
defectors, the probability of the spread of the defector strategy among the entire population is 
muted; it is lower than in the absence of population growth. 
   8 
4 The sustainability of cooperation with population growth 
In  this  section  we  inquire  how  the  preceding  results  are  affected  when  we  allow  the 
population to grow.  
We  introduce  population  growth  by  assuming  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  second 
period of his life, every farmer has two sons. At the end of the farmer’s life, one of the sons, 
the “stayer,” takes over his father’s farm, whereas the second son, the “settler,” along with his 
peers, begins farming around a new lake. Therefore, after each generation, the population of 
active farmers as well as the number of settlements doubles. 
We  assume  that  when  settling  around  the  new  lake,  the  settler  sons  are  placed 
randomly, with uniform probabilities of each of the possible permutations.
3 As in the setting 
without  population  growth,  during  their  childhood  both  sons  learn  from  the  experience 
(payoffs) of their father and his two adjacent neighbors. Consequently, at the time of the 
generational shift, both sons (the stayer and the settler) choose the same strategy, yet they end 
up playing it in different locales. 
We could alternatively assume that the sons settle around the new lake not randomly, 
but rather by mimicking the neighborhood pattern that would have prevailed had they been 
the  only  sons  taking  over  their  fathers’  farms  in  the  ancestral  village.  It  is  immediately 
obvious that in such a case, population growth will not yield an outcome different from that of 
no population growth because the evolution of strategies in the descendant villages will be the 
same as in the ancestral village leading, in terms of the sustainability of cooperation, to the 
same  outcome  across  all  the  settlements.  Therefore,  in  the  population  growth  setting,  we 
attend only to a random placement of the settlers. 
One mutant defector 
To begin with, let there be a randomly placed mutant defector in the population. There 
are two possibilities: if (3 ) 6 n ≤ < , then the batches of three next-generation defectors in each 
                                                 
3 The possibility that on the way to the new lake some sort of a grouping of cooperators will be formed, aimed at 
forming a settlement pattern that is less random and more rewarding, does not align with our framework. This is 
so for two reasons. First, because the sons of a given father observe only the immediate neighbors of their father 
(they do not observe the payoffs of farmers farther away), they cannot foresee the strategies of the sons of 
neighbors of their father, because the information base for the choice of strategies of a neighbor’s sons is not 
available to the sons of a given farmer. (Stark and Behrens, 2010, developed a theory of an evolutionary edge of 
knowing less; more information could well be a curse, not a reward.) Second, because the true strategies of 
settlers are not common knowledge, and because deviators have  no incentive to reveal their true type, any 
exchange of information between the settlers about the strategy that they will adhere to is bound to end with all 
of them presenting themselves as cooperators, making the exchange useless. (For an example of model that in a 
prisoner’s dilemma setting allows selection of counterparts by type, see Stark et al., 2009.)   9 
of the communities are too “massive” to allow for an “island of cooperation” of a size of at 
least three to survive. Therefore, for such a low n, cooperation is doomed. If  6 n ≥ , however, 
then  at  least  in  the  ancestral  village  cooperation  is  not  “endangered;”  as  revealed  by  the 
analysis in the preceding section, the appearance of one mutant defector does not suffice to 
“convert” the ancestral village into a pure defector community. Cooperation will survive at 
least in this village. So in general, we can state that in the case of one mutant defector, in 
terms of the sustainability of cooperation the outcome for a population growth setting is the 
same as the outcome for a no population growth setting. 
Two mutant defectors 
When,  for  9 n = ,  in  the  ancestral  settlement  in  generation  0 t =  two  defectors  are 
randomly placed amongst the remaining seven cooperators, the evolution of strategies in the 
ancestral village will be the same as the evolution depicted in the preceding section for the no 
population  growth  setting.  Even  when  we  allow  now  for  doubling  of  the  number  of 
settlements as described above, if in the ancestral village the two mutant defectors are placed 
according to configurations 
I
0 D , 
II
0 D  or 
III
0 D , cooperation will surely survive at least in that 
village, no matter what will be the outcome of the random placements of the settlers in the 
newly-settled villages. Therefore, the only situation when the overall population has a chance 
of  ending  up  as  a  pure  defector  community  is  the  appearance  of  mutant  defectors  as  in 
configuration 
IV
0 D  (cf. part IV of Figure 3). 
Because the mechanism of “learning” is the same for both settler sons and staying 
sons, we can infer that among the sons who in generation  1 t =  look for a new place to settle, 
there  will  be  six  individuals  who  perceive  defecting  to  be  the  more  successful  strategy  - 
exactly the same number as that which we observed in  1 t =  in the ancestral village (cf. the 
1 t =  depiction in part IV of Figure 3). 
The question to address is whether the random placement of the individuals in the new 
village affects the fate of cooperation which in the ancestral settlement is “doomed.” 
As we know from the conditions discussed before, to “stop” the spread of the defector 
strategy we must have a cluster of at least three cooperators placed against possible clusters of 
defectors. For only three cooperators to be left in a population of nine individuals, this means 
that their placement must be of the form:   10 
 
Figure 4. A configuration  1(9,6) (0,0,0,3,0,0) D =  allowing the survival of cooperation in the 
settlers’ village after an appearance of mutant defectors in the ancestral village according to 
configuration 
IV
0 D . 
The probability of the configuration  1(9,6) (0,0,0,3,0,0) D =  among nine individuals 
out of which six are defectors and three are cooperators, is:
4 
  ( ) 1(9,6) (0,0,0,3,0






= = = .  (3)   
The remaining configurations with the complementary probability 25/28, lead to pure defector 
communities also in this new settlement (and in all of its descendant settlements). 
Therefore, if we assume that the various configurations of settling around the new lake 
are  independent  of  the  placement  of  the  mutant  defectors  around  the  ancestral  lake,  the 
probability of sustaining cooperation in the (overall) population goes up from 3/4 in the no 
population growth model, to  
  ( )
3 1 3 3 3
4 4 28 4 112
P Cooperation = + × = + .  (4)   
In the case of a community of nine farmers who engage in trading activities with their 
closest neighbors, population growth has a distinct beneficial influence on the survival of 
cooperation. We next assess the implications of population growth for the sustainability of 
cooperation when the ancestral population can be of any size  3 n ≥ .  
 
                                                 
4 We  have  3! 6! ×  possible  arrangements  of  three  cooperators  and  six  defectors  giving  exactly  the  same 
configuration as in Figure 4, but this arrangement is equivalent  with respect to nine possible permutations. 
Therefore 3! 6! 9 × ×  arrangements out of a total 9! yields the configuration 
1(9,6) (0,0,0,3,0,0) D = .   11 
5 A generalization  
Consider a probabilistic constellation of the size of the settlement, of the number of the initial 
mutant defectors, and of their placement among settlers; all for generation  0 t = . That is, we 
assume  that  the  initial  settlement  size  ( 3 n ≥ )  is  first  chosen  according  to  a  probability 
distribution  ( ) 3 5 4 , , ,... P p p p =  such that  0 i p >  for  3,4,5,... i = . Next, the number of mutant 
defectors k , 1 k n ≤ ≤ , is chosen according to a probability distribution  ( ) 1,..., n n Q q q =  such 
that  0 i q >  for  1,2,..., i n = . And finally, for given n and k , the configuration in which the 
defectors  appear  in  the  ancestral  village,  ( ) 0 , D n k ,  is  chosen  over  the  set  of  all  possible 
configurations according to a distribution that assigns to each possible configuration a non-
zero probability. Then, a village characterized by the triplet  ( ) ( ) 0 , , , n k D n k  will be treated as 
the ancestral settlement. This settlement then experiences, or does not experience, population 
growth.
5 In the population growth setting, the random placement of the farmers in the newly-
settled villages is governed by a uniform distribution over all possible configurations. 
Since  we  are  interested  in  the  likely  survival  of  cooperation,  we  will  denote  by 
( ) growth P Cooperation  the  ex-ante  (that  is,  before  the  choice  of  the  settlement  size  n) 
probability of the event that cooperation will survive in the long run in at least one of the 2
t 
villages in generation t in the population growth setting,
6 and by  ( ) static P Cooperation  the ex-
ante probability of the event that cooperation will survive in the long run in the ancestral 
village in the static no population growth setting. 
We now state and prove the following claim. 
Claim 1:  ( ) ( ) growth static P Cooperation P Cooperation > . 
Claim 1 tells us that the ex-ante probability of the survival of cooperation is strictly 
higher in the population growth setting than in the no population growth setting.  
Proof: First, we note that 
  ( ) ( ) | , | , growth static n k nP Cooperation n k P Cooperation n k
≤ ≥ ∀ ∀ .  (5) 
                                                 
5 We assume that the (joint) distributions of n, k and  ( ) 0 , D n k  are the same for these two settings. 
6 “Long run” means any generation t which is beyond the moment in time at which the evolution of strategies in 
the ancestral village has reached a stable state.   12 
This inequality arises from the assumption that the distribution of  0( , ) D n k  is the same in the 
population growth setting as in the no population growth setting, and from the fact that in a 
given  configuration  ( ) ( ) 0 , , , n k D n k ,  the  occurrence  of  the  Cooperation  event  in  the  no 
population growth setting implies occurrence of the Cooperation event also in the population 
growth setting, since in both settings the evolution of strategies in the ancestral villages is the 
same. 
Moreover, from the example presented in section 4 we already know that there exists 
at least one combination ( ) , n k , namely  9 n =  and  2 k =  such that
7 
  ( ) ( ) | 9, 2 | 9, 2 growth static P Cooperation n k P Cooperation n k = = > = = .  (6) 
Since  it  follows  from  our  assumptions  about  distributions  of  n  and  k  that 
( ) ( ) , , 0 growth sta n k c n ti P n k P n k
≤ = > ∀∀ , we can infer from using the law of total probability that for 
the ex-ante probabilities we have 
  ( ) ( ) growth static P Cooperation P Cooperation > ,  (7) 
which concludes the proof. □ 
Furthermore,  that  the  probability  of  the  survival  of  cooperation  is  higher  in  the 
population growth setting than in the no population growth setting does not critically hinge on 
the configuration  9 n =  and  2 k = . To this end, we state and prove the following corollary.  
Corollary 1:  ( ) ( )
12 | | growth static n P Cooperation n P Cooperation n
≥ ∀ > . 
Corollary 1 tells us that the ex-ante probability of the survival of cooperation is always 
strictly higher in the population growth setting than in the no population growth setting when 
the community is large enough.  
Proof: We have already noted (5). To prove the corollary, we only need to find for each 
12 n ≥  a k  and an initial configuration  0( , ) D n k  such that defection spreads in the ancestral 
                                                 
7 The calculation, reported in equation (4), of the difference between the probabilities of sustaining cooperation 
in the two settings was for a uniform probability distribution of the  ( ) 0 , D n k  configurations. This quantitative 
result may no longer apply in the more general setting discussed here. Nonetheless, as long as we assume that 
every possible configuration  ( ) 0 , D n k  can be chosen with a non-zero probability, the qualitative result that the 
probability of sustaining cooperation is higher in the population growth setting than in the stagnant population 
setting carries through.    13 
village, whereas in the newly-settled village cooperation survives with a non-zero probability. 
Let k be a natural number satisfying 
  5k n ≥ ,  (8) 
and 
  3 3 n k − ≥ .  (9) 
It is easy to check that such a k exists for any  12 n ≥ .
8 We note that from condition (9) we get 
that 
  3 2 2k k k n ≥ + ≥ − .  (10) 
  Conditions (8) and (9) ensure that there is a non-zero probability that in the ancestral 
village a configuration  ( ) 0 , D n k  will arise such that there are k  defectors, each surrounded 
by clusters of 2, 3, or 4 cooperators, since at least one in five individuals is a mutant defector 
(condition (8)), and at the same time there are more than 2k  cooperators to form clusters 
between the mutants (condition (9) looked at through the prism of (10)). Then, there is no 
cluster of cooperators of sufficient size, namely 5, to sustain the cooperation strategy, and all 
farmers in the ancestral village will exhibit the trait D in the second generation after the 
appearance of mutants. 
Additionally,  in  such  a  ( ) 0 , D n k  configuration  where  each  of  k  mutant  defectors 
trades with two cooperators, there will be exactly ( ) 2 3 n k k n k − − = −  cooperators among the 
settlers in the first generation after the mutation. Now, condition (9) ensures that there are at 
least three cooperators settling on the shores of the new lake. Since all possible configurations 
of farmers in the newly-settled village occur with a non-zero probability, it is possible that the 
settlers form two clusters, one of cooperators and one of defectors. And since the cluster of 
cooperators is at least of size 3, cooperation will survive in this descendant village. This 
concludes the proof. □  
Two  words  of  clarification  are  in  order.  First,  our  criterion  for  the  survival  of 
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for  3 k = .   14 
cooperation  (defined  as  the  occurrence  of  the  Cooperation  event)  does  not  tell  us  the 
prevalence or fraction of cooperating farmers in the total population of the settlements in a 
given generation. It may well be the case that in the setting of population growth with a 
random placement of the new farms, the expected ratio of cooperators to defectors is lower 
than in the no population growth setting.  In addition, even the expected number of pure-
defector settlements can be higher in the population growth setting than in the no population 
growth setting. Still, our interest is in the probability of survival of cooperation somewhere in 
the settlements and, as we have shown, this probability is higher in the population growth 
setting than in the no population growth setting. 
Second, we do not address the question how population pressure or environmental 
carrying capacity might impact on the link between population growth and cooperation. There 
are good reasons for this. In our setting, the “fate” of cooperation is decided in a relatively 
short span of time.
9 Therefore, factors that may be associated with the depletion of resources 
and untenable farming space are unlikely to influence the rate of population growth or the 
payoffs from farming activities. Nor is it proven that population pressure depletes resources. 
Boserup (1981), Simon (1977, 1996), and others have persuasively argued that “necessity is 
the  mother  of  invention,”  and  marshaled  powerful  evidence  that  refutes  the  Malthusian 
theory.  We  thus  elected  to  refrain  from  considering  this  issue  within  the  confines  of  the 
present paper. 
 
6 A link with evolutionary biology 
The study of the relationship between demographic processes and the prevalence of 
altruism  or  the  incidence  of  cooperative  behavior  has  a  long  tradition  in  evolutionary 
biology.
10 However, in a number of respects our approach differs from that of evolutionary 
studies. 
In  his  pioneering  work,  Hamilton  (1964)  modeled  the  influence  of  cooperative 
behavior between relatives, acting through so called inclusive fitness (a measure of fitness 
accounting for the “external” effects of the altruistic acts of relatives), on the spread of the 
                                                 
9 This time span is given by the number of generations during which the defector strategy spreads in the ancestral 
village. This number of generations is smaller than the number of farmers in the ancestral village. 
10 For a comprehensive recent review see Lehmann and Rousset (2010).   15 
gene that carries the predisposition of such behavior in the population.
11 The prevalence of 
cooperative behavior was connected to viscosity, that is, to the tendency of relatives to live in 
close proximity. Consequently, the success of the “cooperative gene” depends on the balance 
between losses from the competition for limited resources in the occupied area and gains from 
the altruistic behavior of relatives who share a similar genetic endowment.  
Studies that followed the work of Hamilton (1964) looked more closely at viscosity 
and at different approaches to the spread of cooperating organisms (see, for example, Rogers, 
1990; Taylor, 1992; and Gardner and West, 2006). However, the models in these studies did 
not account directly for population growth but rather assumed a constant or an infinite number 
of organisms, placing emphasis on the fraction of the organisms in the population that possess 
the “altruistic” gene.  
More closely related to the population growth theme are the models of van Baalen and 
Rand (1998), Lehman et al. (2006), and Lion and Gandon (2009), who show that allowing a 
cluster of altruistic individuals to grow increases the probability of the spread of altruism. 
However, this positive effect on the prevalence of altruism is not brought about by growth of 
the overall population but is rather the result of the expansion of the local cooperating group; 
by dimming the competition between relatives the expansion unshackles the advantages of 
cooperative behavior. 
The choice of strategy in our model does not emanate from a genetic endowment nor 
from a predisposition of the individual; rather, it is an outcome of rational choice based on 
information garnered through observation of the environment: individuals optimize subject to 
an informational constraint. A strategy of a parent does not translate automatically into the 
strategy of the offspring.  
In  our  setting,  although  the  procedure  of  settlement  of  the  offspring  might  be 
reminiscent of the “budding dispersal” model of Gardner and West (2006), the payoff from 
cooperation and the choice of the cooperative strategy itself do not depend on a counterpart 
being a relative nor, for that matter, on any measure of family relatedness.  
In sum, our approach is more suitable to analyze traits among human  populations 
where  strategies  are  selected  on  the  basis  of  decisions,  rather  than  being  implanted  as  a 
consequence of a genetic endowment. In a way, we could say that our model “takes over” 
                                                 
11 For a derivation of “Hamilton’s rule” in a game-theory setting similar to the payoff structure used in the 
current paper, see Stark and Wang (2004).   16 
altruistic  individuals  whose  characteristics  could  have  been  formed  in  some  evolutionary 
process, and studies the fate of cooperation in a growing population from a point in time at 
which the individuals’ development allows a conscious choice of behavior that may just as 
well constitute a break with genetic predisposition.  
 
7 Conclusions 
Drawing on a simple setting of a community of farmers who live around a lake and 
who  trade  each  with  his  two  adjacent  neighbors,  we  studied  the  consequences  for  the 
sustainability of cooperation of two scenarios: no population growth, and population growth. 
We found that population growth that results in the formation of new settlements strictly 
increases the probability that a defector strategy, introduced initially by mutations, will not 
spread  to  the  entire  community.  That  population  growth  is  positively  correlated  with  the 
sustainability of the cooperative habit in a community provides a new explanation for the 
advantages enjoyed by a growing population over a stagnant population. And indeed, since 
under a standard one-shot prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure as employed by us a pure-
defector  community  has  the  lowest  per-capita  payoff  of  all  cooperator-defector 
configurations, we infer that in the specific environment studied by us, a growing population 
has  some  feature  that  supports  future  population  growth  prospects  which  is  missing  in  a 
stagnant population. 
We  note  that  population  growth  will  not  impact  differentially  on  the  evolution  of 
cooperation when the new settlements are mere replicas of the existing settlement, yet that it 
will be conducive to the evolution of cooperation when the pattern of settling “around the new 
lakes” is random. A fascinating topic of historical research would be a comparative study of 
the pattern of settlement of the first, “cloning” type, for example that of the medieval German 
settlements  in  Eastern  Europe  -  the  Ostsiedlung  (Dickinson,  1945;  Higounet,  1990)  - 
replicating the structures of the towns of origin, and of the essentially second, random type, 
for example that of the British colonization of new lands in North America’s Great Plains and 
Australia.
12 On  a  more  abstract  level,  a  study  of  the  correlation  between  a  measure  of 
cooperation  in  societies  and  the  rate  of  population  growth  of  societies  will  be  just  as 
intriguing: is it the case that populations that were for some exogenous reason able to grow 
                                                 
12 We thank Doris A. Behrens for drawing our attention to the German experience of settlement in Eastern 
Europe during medieval times.   17 
faster developed norms of cooperation? What can be learned from a study of the historical 
developments of mankind? From anthropological accounts? 
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Appendix: Payoffs and progeny 
In this appendix, we attend to the possibility of a link between payoffs and reproductive 
outcomes; progeny could plausibly be increasing in payoffs, entailing a pattern of differential 
population growth rather than a uniform population growth.  
  Let m, the number of sons that a farmer has, be a function of the farmer’s payoff: 
) ( m ω ∈N  for ω∈Ω , where  {2 ,2 , , ,2 ,2 } S P S R T P R T Ω∈ + +  is the set of possible payoffs 
from farming-cum-trading for which assumptions (1) and (2) hold,
13 and let 
  1 2 2 1 ( ) )  for  ( m m ω ω ω ω > ≥ .   
We assume (i) that each farmer has at least one son, that is,  (2 ) 1 m S ≥ ; (ii) that if a farmer has 
exactly  one  son,  this  son  takes  over  his  father’s  farm;  and  (iii)  that  a  cooperator  farmer 
surrounded by two cooperators has at least two sons, that is,  (2 ) 2 m R ≥ . 
Since the number of settler sons can be different from (or may not be a multiple of) the 
number of farms in the ancestral village, we need to specify further the process of settling 
around the new lake(s). Let then the number of farms in the ancestral village, n, also denote 
the maximal number of farms around a lake, namely n delineates the “carrying capacity” of a 
single  lake.  Then,  a  generation  of  sons  from  a  single  ancestral  village  settles  around  the 
minimal number of lakes that is sufficient to accommodate them all. The process of settlement 
around the new lake(s) takes place in a uniformly random fashion, namely, all the settlers 
have equal probability of occupying every available farm.
14 
When a lake is settled by fewer farmers than the maximal “carrying capacity” of the 
lake, each farmer fences up the additional space for his farm, such that future generations of 
settlers  cannot  join  an  already-settled  lake.  Since  farming-cum-trading  requires  contact 
between neighbors, larger farms imply also longer distances, on average, to be covered during 
the  joint  activities  of  neighbors.  Since  the  advantage  of  larger  farms  is  offset  by  the 
disadvantage of higher costs of communication/cooperation between the farmers, the payoffs 
can be held the same as in the preceding settings. 
                                                 
13  We  note  that  assumptions  (1)  and  (2)  do  not  yield  a  complete  ordering  of  the  Ω  set;  only  that 
2 2 2 2 S P T P R T < < + < < , that  2S S R < + , and that  S R T P + < + . This incompleteness has no bearing, 
however, on the discussion that follows. 
14 We do not specify in additional detail how the space around the newly-settled lakes is organized into farms 
because this is not crucial for our argument. For example, settlement could take place so as to fill all lakes but 
one to their “carrying capacity” or, alternatively, such that the number of farms around each settled lake is the 
same.   19 
The  remaining  specification  of  the  model  (the  choice  of  ( ) ( ) 0 , , , n k D n k ,  the 
independence of random distributions, and so on) is the same as in section 4. 
In this revamped setting, the results presented in section 4 continue to apply. To see 
this, note, first, that assumptions (i) and (ii) ensure that the evolution of strategies in the 
ancestral village is the same in the differential fertility setting as in the no population growth 
setting. Therefore, if cooperation is preserved in the no population growth setting, it will also 
be preserved in the population growth setting, at least in the ancestral village. Second, if 
9 n = ,  2 k = , and the initial placement of mutant defectors is as per configuration 
IV
0 D  (cf. 
Figure 3), assumption (iii) ensures that there will be at least three settlers who will choose the 
cooperation strategy, and at least two settlers who will choose the defection strategy. Then, in 
the course of the settlement of the new village(s), there is a strictly positive probability that 
the settling arrangement will yield an “island” of at least three cooperators, surrounded by 
defectors who receive a payoff of T P +  from trading with a cooperator and with a defector, a 
configuration that serves to guarantee sustainability of the cooperation strategy in the new 
settlement, even if in the ancestral village cooperation is “doomed.” It follows then that in the 
differentiated population growth setting, the probability of occurrence of the Cooperation 
event (survival of cooperation) is higher than in the no population growth setting. 
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